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INTER-SOCIETY DEBATE.
Arrangements are being made for an Inter-Society Debate in the law school, to be
held some time during the early part of the,
coming term. The intention of the societies is to make this an important event in
the college year, and one which will be
looked upon and considered as similar
events are regarded in colleges and law
schools where they have been held, namely,
one of high honor and merit. This is a
very commendable move, and one in a
proper direction. The Dickinson Law
School has never had a public contest of
this character, and the need of it has been
felt and remarked upon each succeeding
year and now that it is embarked upon, it
will give to the work in the societies an
additional value, and will add to the desire for a membership therein; it will stimulate the members to put forth stronger
and 4bler efforts, and result in an all
around benefit.
PRIZES.
The Edward Thompson Company offers
as a prize to that member of the Middle
class who shall produce the best essay on
the Action of Ejectment in Pennsylvania,
the Encyclopedia of Pleading and Practice, consisting of fifteen volumes.
The prize offered by Win. C. Allison is
to that member of the Senior class who

shall write the best thesis on "The Landlord's Remedies for the Recovery of the
Possession of the Leased Premises in
Penna."
As last year, a prize will be awarded that
member of the junior class who shall pass
the best examination in Real Property.
A prize is offered, as last year, to the
Middle class, for the best briefs in cases to
be tried in the January-June term.
The names of all persons who intend contesting for these prizes must be handed to
the Dean, not later than two weeks from
Wednesday, January 11th, the opening
day of the term.

ALUMNI.
Bruce Campbell, '96, was in town lately
in the interests of the Sonoru Mining
Company of Mexico, with which he is connected, being treasurer of the organization.
He spent the entire past summer at these
mines which are situated in the State of
Sonoru, Republic of Mexico.
Rufus V. B. Lincoln, Law, '96, and
formerly a practitioner at Shamokin, Pa.,
has left that place and is now sojourning
in the "Rockies" for his health. We are
sorry to note that "Link" hasbeen troubled
with lung disease during the past summer
and trust he will be favored with a speedy
and complete recovery.
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Robt. Walling Irving, '97, stumped New
York state in the interest of Judge Van
Wyck during the last campaign. He delivered an address before the Pequod Club,
a branch organization of Tammany Hall,
and received a highly creditable n6tice in
the New York Journal.
Jere Omwake, '95, of Shippensburg and
a member of the Cumberland county bar,
was in town recently, in the interests of
the Shippensburg Water Company.
Ray Zug, '96, has entered the engineering field, and is connected -with the
Youngstown Iron Company of Youngstown, Ohio. He is still retained as cartoonist and illustrator of the Dickinson
College Microcosm.
Blake Irvine, '97, is spending a few days
in town. He intends going to Honolulu
in the spring, when, with Robt. Irving,
'97, who will probably accompany him, he
will administer Yankee law to the inhabitants of our lately acquired territory.
G. H. Moyer, '97, who has been practicing in Cumberland county, will shortly remove to Lebanon county, there to resume
the practice of the profession.
Fickes, '95, is enjoying a very remunerative practice In Scranton.
0 * **
Shean, '96, read a paper on the early
settlement of Maryland, before a Scranton
Society,. a short time since. The paper
was very highly praised and called forth
much commendable comment for its erudition and style.
I. I. Wingert, '97, of Franklin county
bar, was married during the month of
November to one of Carlisle's fair ladies.
Barker, '97, was in town recently on a
matter of business.
Wetzel, '98, made his first appearance in
court as counsel, in the recent argument
court of Cumberland county,

Win. C. Allison, a member of the class
of '92, the first class to graduate from the
Law School. attended a meeting of the
Executive Committee of Dickinson College, of which he is a member.
0 **
Harvey S. Kiser, '96, has hung up his
shingle as attorney and counsellor at law
in Doylestown, Pa. He is meeting with
very gratifying success.
S. B. Sadler, '98, has obtained a rule for
a quo warranto against a Justice of the
Peace of Carlisle. The case involves the
right of ward justices to execute the office.

THE SCHOOL.
The present term closes Dec. 16, and the
session opens on the second Wednesday of
January.
Quite a number of students accompanied
the foot-ball team to Williamsport, on
Thanksgiving Day.
The Dickinson College Concert Co., of
which Sellers, '99, is a member, with the
Indian Band, gave their first entertainment this year before the Teachers' Institute. The programme was a very enjoyable one.
At a meeting of the Middle Class held
Nov. 1, the following persons were elected
as class officers for the ensuing year:
President-D. Edward Long.
Vice-President-Chas. McMeans.
Secretary-Chas. H. Meyer.
Treasurer-Leon C. Prince.
The following members of the Law
School have been initiated into the Delta
Chi Fraternity during the past month:
Harry P. Conly, Jno. B. Lavens, Win. H.
Kern, Chas. Piper, Frank J. Laubenstein,
Daniel F. Deal, Jno. G. Millar, J. P. Rueffer. Arthur W. Mitchel, James B. O'Keefe
and Holcomb.
The Junior Class had their first "exam"
in Contracts under Dr. Trickett, Nov. 25.
John Smith, '98, is in the office of the
Fidelity Loan & Trust Co., Phila.

THE FORUM.
Philip Radle is in town at present, the
guest of his sister, Miss Radle, of the Middle Class.
THE ALLISON SOCIETY.
The work of the society is progressing
most favorably. Thus far the society has
given its attention exclusively to the trial
of cases, and have initiated the Juniors
into the mysteries of a trial brief.
On Friday evening, Nov. 15, a case of
implied contract was discussed. Messrs.
Bolte and Alexander appeared for the
plaintiff and Messrs. Harpell and Shambaugh for the defendant. Merkel Landis
sat as Judge. After the trial of the case
the society resolved themselves into a jury
to deliberate on the evidence in the cas&of
Commonwealth vs. Shullenberger. A most
profitable hour was spent in the discussion
of this case.
On December 2, another case in c6ntract
was tried, Herman Sypherd sitting as
Judge. The plaintiff was represented by
Messrs. Lightner and Rothermel, while
the interests of the defendant were looked
after by Messrs. Valentine and Long.
Arrangements are being made for an
Inter-Society debate to be held in the near
future.

DICKINSON SOCIETY.
At the meeting of Nov. 8, Wm. A. Jordan was unanimously elected to succeed
Geo. W. Aubrey, as president.
The program of this evening's meeting
consisted of a case in assumpsit, involving
the liabilities of a physician in Mnaking a
wrongful diagnosis of a case, argued ably
by Messrs. Oiler and Henderson, plaintiffs,
and Messrs. Wallace and Scheeline, defendants. The presiding Judge was G. H.
Moyer of the Allison Society.
At the following meeting held Nov. 15,
the society held an impromptu debate,
"Should the U. S. pay $20,000,000 for the
Phillipines," commendably discussed by
Messrs. Oiler and Wallace, affirmative, and
Scheeline and Hess, negative. The able
manner in which the speakers handled the
question demonstrated to a great extent
the result of a literary training, and the
intrinsic value obtained therefrom in aiding one to say something on the "spur of
the moment."

The climax of the meetings held during
the month was reached on the eve of Dec.
2, when the following programme was
rendered: Debate, Resolved, "That the
present jury system should be abolished."
Mr. Sebring ably debated the affirmative,
while Mr. Merkel strongly defended the
negative. Thejudges unanimously decided
the debate in the affirmative. One of the
new features of the program was a paper
prepared by J. T. Caldwell on the subject
of "Historical Sketch of Tax Legislation
in Pa." The paper showed careful and
diligent research, a ad was not only highly
entertaining, but also very instructive.
Recitations by Mr. Hare and Miss Radle
followed, and were greatly appreciated by
the audience.
The meetings of the Dickinson Society
held recently, afford sufficient corroboration of the truth of the statement that the
interest and activity of the work increases
with every successive meeting.

MOOT COURT.
PETER CALVERT vs. ADAMS EXPRESS COMPANY.
Common Carrier-Identification-Cariers'
Liabilities.
Motion for non-suit.
STANLEY WINLACK and W. W. JOHN-

SON for plaintiff.
1. An express company is a common
carrier.-Sweet et at. v. Barney et al., 23
N. Y. 335.
'2. The identification was not sufficient.
Ross & Lawrence Law Dictionary, Vol. 1.
3. An express company is liable for delivery of goods to wrong parties.-94 U. S.
549; A. & Eng. Enc. of Laws, Vol. 2, p.
887 note 1; Price v. Oswego & Syratcuse
R. R. Co., 50 N. Y. 217.
J3Ams LIGHTNER and W. B. GERY for

defendant.
1. Company mere transmitter, not carrier. Reasonable diligence was used in
identifying the person intended.-Powell
v. Myers, 26 Wend. 591 ; McEntee v. N. J.
S. Co., 45 N. Y. 34; Fisk v. Newton, 1
Lewis 45.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Peter Calvert resided in New York, and
had an agent in the State of Kansas,
named John Brown, who purchased potatoes for him, and frequeatly telegraphed
for the remission of moneys. Peter Sipe
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aware of this fact, telegraphed from Hutchinson, Kansas, to Peter Calvert for $1,000,
directing it to be forwarded by Adams
Express Company, signing the telegram,
John Brown. Both Brown and Sipe were
unknown to the Adams Express Company. Sipe received a telegraphic reply,
addressed to Brown, that the money had
been forwarded. On its arrival Sipe took
the telegram to t he Express Company, and
requested that the money be paid to him.
The agent of the Express Company insisted that lie be identified, and he produced the telegraphic operator, who assured the agent of the Express Company
that Sipe was the person who had sent and
received the telegram. The money was
given to Sipe, who receipted for it in the
name of Browli. The plaintiff oflibred to
show these facts on the trial of the case.
Objected to by the defendant, because it
showed' no liability to the plaintiff on the
part of the defendant. On motion of defendant, court directed that an involuntary non-suit be entered. Plaintiff moves
to take off non-suit.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This action is brought by Peter Calvert
to recover the sum of $1,000 from the
Adams Express Company. The plaintiff
is a resident of New York, and was accustonied to send large sums to his Western
agent, John Brown, upon telegraphic application. Peter Sipe. knowing of the relations existing between the parties, telegraphed in the name of Brown, requesting
that $1,000 beimmediately sent to him by
the Adams Express Company. This message was duly acknowledged, the answer
addressed to Brown being delivered to
Sipe. The defendant corporation receiving the money consigned to Brown, delivered the same to Sipe, identifying him as
Brown by means of the two telegrams
above mentioned, and by the telegraph
operator, who stated that this was the
person who had sent the message signed
Brown, and received the one addres-sed to
that individual.
It was the duty of the Express Company
to deliver the consignment to the consignee. It must see, at its peril, that the
property reaches the proper hands. "No
.ohligation of the carrier is more rigidly

enforced than that which requires delivery
to the proper person, and the law will
allow of no excuse for the wrong delivery,
except the fault of the shipper himself."Furnian v. Union P. R. Co., 106 N.Y. 579.
" And if the common carrier hands over
to a person other than the consignee,
though innocently and by mistake, but
without the order and authority of the
consignor, an action will lie for their value
in case of loss thereby."-Wernwag &
Dawson v. R. R. Co., 117 Pa. 46.
The carrier may require the production
of evidence to show thau the person denianding the property is the consigneeMcEntee v. N. J. S. B. Co., 45 N. Y. 34;
and it will be protected in refusing to deliver the goods until reasonable proof is
furnished that the party claiming is the
person so entitled.-B. & 0. R. Co. v.
Pumphrey,59 Md. 390.
The authorities are uniform in holding
that carriers are under such obligation as
to delivery of goods to the proper consignee that no imposition on the carrier

will be sufficient to exonerate it from responsibility in case of mistake. The decisions of the various States, however, are
not uniform as to the liability of the company in case of inisdelivery due to imposition practiced upon the consignor. But
the weight of authority seems to uphold
the contention that it is responsible even
in this case, being practically an insurer
against fraud.
In Pacific Express Company v. Shearer,
160 Ill. 215, we find a state of facts exactly
similar to those under consideration. Here
the Supreme Court held that "the carrier
is an insurer of safe delivery of the goods
to the person to whom they are consigned;
an(d no mistake by it, or its agent, however satisfactory the circumstances of
identification may be, will relieve the company from responsibility for-mis-delivery
of the goods."
The same rule was laid down in the
analogous cases of Price v. Oswego & S. R.
Co., 50 N. Y. 213, and American Express
Co. Y. Fletcher, 25 Ind. 442.
We cannot but come to the conclusion
that the plaintiff in this case is entitled to
a recovery.
We shall therefore take.off the judgment
of non-suit.

THE FORUM.
WM. THOMPSON vs. CARLISLE

STREET RAILWAY CO.
Authority of borough ordinances over cors re.V)onporations-'regligence-Ma,ter'
.dibilityfor negligence oj sernants.
Motion to enter judgment on special
verdict.
S. E. BASEHORE and H.

V. RTJSSELL

for plaintiff.
Railway corporations subject to city or
borough ordinances.-Frankfort & Philadelphia Passenger Railway Co. v. The
City of Philadelphia, 8 P. F. Smith 119.
Railway company iegligent.-Yingst v.
Railway Co., 167 Pa. 438 ; Greely Vs. Railway Co., 153 Pa. 218.
Violation of municipal ordinance evidence of negligence.-Massath v. Delaware
and Hudson Canal Co., 64 N. Y. 524; P.
R. R. Co. v. James and Wife, 8U, Pa. 194.
H. M. COLLINS and W. S. CLARK for
defendant.
Violation of city ordinance not negligenceper se.-Lederman vs. P. R. R. Co.,
165 Pa. 118; Florence Conner v. Electric
L. Co., 173 Pa. 602.
Street R. R. Co. is not responsible fox,
horses taking fright at the movement or
their cars.-Hazel v. Railway Co., 132 Pa.
96.
The breach of an ordinance regulating
the speed of street cars is not evidence of
negligence on the part of the street car
company.-Philadelphia & Reading R. R.
v. Ervin, 89 Pa. 71 ; Cramer v. Traction
Co., 173 Pa. 602; Davidson v. Traction
Co., 4 Sup. Ct. 86.
STATEMENT OF' THE CASE.

Special erdict.-The jury found that
Thompson, the plaintiff, is the owner of
four horses and a wagon, and that on the
1st day of October, 1897, in the discharge of
his lawful occupation, he drove alongNorth
Hanover street, in the borough of Carlisle.
That the defendant owned and operated a
sti'eet railway, passing over the same highway. The ordinance under which the
railway operated provided that the speed
of the car should be limited to five miles
per hour. That on the day in question a
car of the company ran in the same direction as the team of the plaintiff at the rate
of ten miles an hour. That the high rate
of speed resulted in more noise and conimnotion than if it had been run at the rate
provided in the ordinance. When the car
overtook the team the horses of the plaintiff became frightened and umnanugeable,
and ran upon the tracks of the defendant

comlpany, resulting in the killing of a horse
valued at $100, and the breaking of a wagon, costing $25 to repair.
If, under these facts and the law, the
court is of the opinion that the plaintiff is
entitled to recover, then we find for the
plaintiff $12.5, otherwise we find for the
defendant.
Motion to enter judgment on verdict for
plaintiff.
OPINION OF COURT.

Attorneys for the plaintiff have moved
the court to enter judgment on the special
verdict rendered by tile jury in this case.
This is opposed on the part of the defendants mainly on the ground that tile verdict does not contain sufficient on which
to base such a judgment. "It is essential
that all the facts upon which thejudgment
of the court shall rest be stated in the verdict. Nothing is to be taken by implication or intendment. Whatever is not
found in it is presumed not to exist."McCormick & Son v. Royal Ins. Co., 163
Pa. 184.
In the case at bar the jury has failed to
find that the injury sustained by the plaintiff was the result of the running of the
car ata high rate of speed by the corporation defendant, and the court would not
be justified in making this inference as a
matter of law. "Negligence is always a
question of fact, to be determined by the
jury, particularly where contributory negligence is iuvolved."-Davidson v. Traction Co., 4 Pa. Sup. Ct. 86.
This being our determination, it is unnecessary to discuss the other points raised
by the attorneys on the argument, and by
the excellent briefs submitted.
Motion for judgment overruled.
JAMES BROWN vs. SUN INS. ('O.
(,on'eyawe f realtly r(scollateralsecurity
-Act of 1881Written defeasanee.
Motion to take off compulsory non-suit.
HESS and WALLACE for plaintiff
An&r conveyance which, upon its face,
appears to have been intended as security
for the payment of money nmust be construed as a nortgage.-Stoever v. Stoever,
9 Serg. & R. 446 ; %iatthews v. Sheehan,
69 N. Y. 585.
Parol evidence is admissible to show the
existence of a separate oral agreement,
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which induced the disposition of the realty.
-Martin
v. Fridenberg, 169 Pa. 447;
Cooper v. Potts, 185 Pa. 127; First Nat.
Bank v. Wirebach, 106 Pa. 37.
The statute of 1881 does not apply to this
particular case.-Construction of Statutes;
Daniels v. Com., 7 Barr 373.

rule," says Biddle, 1 Ins. 207, "the clauses
against sales or alienations by the insured
have been held to mean sales in a popular
sense, and not mortgages ; that is, to mean
a complete parting with the property.
Thus the clause against 'alienations' is
SEnBRING and VLENTINE for defendant.
not broken by a mortgage."-Cf. Elliott v.
Conveyance was a deed, under act of
Ins. Co., 117 Pa. 548 ; Millville Mut. Ins.
June 8, 1881. This act has been endorsed
Co. v. Wilgres, 88 Pa. 107; Kronk v. Birby the Supreme ('ourt.-Huston v. Regn,
mingham Ins. Co., 91 Pa. 300.
184 Pa. 419; Molly v. Ulrich, 133 Pa. 41.
No consideration is necessary.-Foulby
After the policy had been issued Brown
v. Foulby, 34 Ind. 433 ; Saberee v. Carleinduced Flinn to become endorser on a
ton, 53 Me. 211 ; Brown v. Bank of Chamnote for $6,000, in order that Brown might
bersburg, 3 Pa. 187. Indorsement for loan
procure a loan of that amount, by making
was sufficient consideration.
a conveyance of the premises. While the
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
deed was in the ordinary form, it was
Oil the trial of the cause the plaintiff given and received as a collateral security.
showed that he was the owner of a tavern
The loan was obtained upon the note.
and store-house in Newville. That the
Whether this loan has been repaid or not,
same was insured for $10,000 in the comand Flinn liberated from his liability, does
pany defendant. It appeared from the
not appear. Was the conveyance to Flinn
policy that one of the conditions was, that
an "alienation ?"
if the property should be alienated during
Very many cases decided on transactions
the time of the insurance the policy should
occurring before the act of June8, 1881.
become void. Brown, desiring to borrow
have held that it may be shown orally
money, induced Tobias Flinn to become
tdiat a deed absolute in form was intended
his endorser for a loan of $6,000 by conveyby the parties to secure the repayment by
ing to him the insured property. The
the grantor of a sum of money, or the disconveyance was made, the oral undercharge of the grantee from some liability
standing being that it was to be held as
assumed by him for the grantor. That
collateral security. No defeasance or writact, however, declares that no defeasance
ing of any kind was executed on the part
to any deed for real estate shall have the
of Flinn, nor was any put of record.
effect of reducing it to a mortgage, "unTwelve months afterward the property
less the defeasance is made at the time the
burned. Proofs of loss were duly made.
deed is made, and is in writing, signed,
The defendant then moved for a comsealed, acknowledged and delivered by the
pulsory non-uit, which the court granted
grantee in the deed to the grantor, and is
on the ground that no liability was shown
recorded within 60 days from the execution
on the part of the defendant. Motion now
thereof," etc. This is a statute of frauds,
made by plaintiff to take off compulsory
which, like other statutes of the same
non-suit.
class, may in the course of years produce
OPINION OF THE COURT.
as many frauds as it prevents. But its
That the defendant issued a policy to the
impolicy, in the judgment of courts, is not
plaintiff for $10,000 is conceded, as well as
to prevent their enforcement of it. The
the destruction of the building insured by
consequence is that, even if a defeasance
is orally shown to have accompanied the
fire within the term of the policy. What
hinders, then, that the plaintiff should redeed, it cannot operate as a defeasance.
cover the money ?
"There is now but one method left by
One of the conditions of the policy was,
which a deed absolute can be reduced to a
that the property should not be alienated
mortgage. *
*
*
* The defeasance
during the period covered by it. The demust not only be in writing, and of the
same date as that of the deed, but it must
fendant alleges that there has been an
also be signed, sealed, acknowledged and
alienation. Has there?
It has been often held that, in the phrase delivered by the grantee in the deed to the
found in this policy, the word "alienated"
grantor," and it must be recorded in two
would not embrace a mortgage. "As a
months.-Sankey v. Hawley, 118 Pa. 30.

THE FORUM.
Hence, even if the defeasance is written,
it will be void, unless acknowleaged and
recorded.-Id., Felt's Appeal, 1 Mona. 282;
Molly v. Ulrich, 133 Pa. 41. In some of
these cases the grantor unsuccessfully
sought to recover the land from the grantee
by proving the defeasance. In 133 Pa. 41
he was foiled in an attempt to recover the
value of the land.
The Brown conveyance to Flinn was not
accompanied by a written defeasance. Being oral, the defeasance was, of course, not
signed, sealed, acknowledged, delivered
or recorded. However clear the proof of
it therefor, it cannot have "the effect of
reducing (the deed) to a mortgage." The
deed, in itself, is an absolute conveyance.
It cannot be made less. The consequence
is inevitable. The Brown property has
been alienated during the period of the
policy. He is no longer the owner of the
house. The destruction of it is a loss, not
to him but to Flinn. The motion to take
off the non-suit must therefore be overruled.
SIMPSON vs. BURDETT.
Transfer ofpatent right by ne lotiable note
-Bight of endorsee.
Act of 1872.
O' EEFE and HOLCOMB for plaintiff.
A note given in consideration of a patent
right, but without so stating on its face, is
not absolutely void. An endorsee, for
value, without notice, may maintain an
action on it.-Metropolitan Nat. Bank v.
Sieber, 11 Phila. 558; Haskell v. Jones, 86
Pa. 173 ; Hunter v. Henninger, 93 Pa. 373.
Statutes imposing conditions on the
transfer of patent rights are unconstitutional.-Gilman v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall.
713; Helm v. First Nat. Bank, 43 Ind.
167.
BOLTE and YEAGER for defendant.
Act of April 12, 1872, is constitutional.Shire v. Com., 120 Pa. 368; Haskell v.
Jones, 86 Pa. 173.
Relief will not be granted for mistake of
statutory law.-79 Ind. 233; 8 Ill. 506; A.
& Eng. Encyc. of Law, Vol. 15, 637.
A negotiable promissory note given for
a patent right, but not containing the required words, is void between the original
parties.-Bowen v. Kemerer, 11 Phila. 5.57;
Graham's Estate, 10 W. N. C. 83.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

S'pecial Verdict.-" The jury find that
the defendant, Mathias Burdett, purchased

a patent right for an improved gate from
Grant Walters for $500, and gave his negotiable promissory note therefor, payable
six months after date at the Farmers'
Bank, Carlisle, at which place the transaction took place. Olney Simpson, plaintiff, purchased the note in good faith before maturity, and without any knowledge
that it had been given for a patent right,
but on the representation that the consideration was a lot of lumber. Nothing
appeared on the note to indicate that it
had been given for a patent right. If the
court should be of the opinion that the
law as applied to these facts entitles the
plaintiff to recover, then we find for the
plaintiff $500, with interest, otherwise we
find for the defendant."
Motion of plaintiff for judgment on verdict.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Olney Simpson purchased the Burdett
note before its maturity, and without
knowledge that it had been given for a
patent right. Under the law merchant
the fraud, if any, practiced by Grant Walters could not be setup asa defense against
Simpson.
If Simpson cannot recover, it must be
because of the act of April 12, 1872.-1 P.
& L. 346. That act requires that when a
negotiable note is given in consideration
of a right to make, use or vend any patented invention, the words "given for a
patent right" shall be legibly printed or
written on it, and makes the taking, selling or transferring of such a note, without
these words, a misdemeanor.
Although by the courts of some States
similar statutes have been decided to be
in excess of the power of a State Legislature, a contrary view obtains in Pennsylvania.-Shires v. The Commonwealth, 120
Pa. 368; Haskell v. Jones, 86 Pa. 173.
What, then, is the effect on the note of
the omission from it of the prescribed
words? Is it absolutely void? No action
could be sustained upon it by the payee,
Grant Walters.-Bowen v. Kemerer, 11
Phila. 557; Graham's Estate, 10 W. N. C.
83. But an endorsee, for value, without
notice, may maintain an action ol it.Hunter v. Henninger, 93 Pa. 373 ; Haskell
v. Jones, 86 Pa. 173. Itis not then strictly
void, though some of the decisions so describe it.
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It follows that the plaintiff is entitled to
judgment on the special verdict.

arm was broken and who was rendered unfit to follow his ordinary occupation for

three months. The salary which he derived
from his occupation was $75 per month,
and he was compelled to expend for medicine and medical attendance $100.
Liability of common carrier-Dangerous The defendant objected on the ground
passengers-Degreeof care to be exer- that the above offer showed no liability on
cised.
the part of the defendant.
W. S. ROTHERmIEL and A.W. MITCHELL
OPINION OF THE COURT.
for the plaintiff.
1. Relation and duty of carrier to pasShould the evidence offered by the plainsenger.-Rommel v. Schambacher, 120 Pa. tiff be admitted? It should be if, being
579; Long v. Coller, 8 Pa. 483.
2. .Carriers of passengers are bound to -believed, it would justify a recovery, either
use their utmost care and skill in the per- unconditionally, or unless the defendant,
formance of their duties. -Bryant v. Rich, by countervailingevidence, repelled the in106 Mass. 588; N. J. Steamboat Co. v. ference which might legitimately be drawn
Brockell, 121 U. S. 637; Meier v. Pa. B. R.
from it.
Co., 64 Pa. St. 22.
3. Negligence on the part of the railroad
That it is the duty of the railroad comcompany.-Canal v. Bentley, 66 Pa. 30;
pany -not to carry its passengers safely;
Pitts. R. R. v. McClung, 56 Pa. 294.
for to hold that would be to make them inW. W. MEARKLE and L. P. COBLENTZ surers of the safety of their passengers, and
for the defendant.
1. There was no negligence on the part they are not insurers-Fredericks v. N. C.
of the defendant. A contract made dur- R. R., 157 Pa. 103; Laing v. Colder, 8 Pa.
ing a lucid interval is binding.-11 Am. 482; Pittsburg, etc., R. R. Co. v. Pillow,
& Eng. Encyc. 111; Wharton on Con- 76 Pa. 510,-but to exercise a very high detracts, 142; Gangwere's Appeal, 14 Pa. gree of care and caution in the carriage of
417 ; Pidcock v. Potter, 68 Pa. 342.
them, is indisputable. This care and cau2. Carriers of passengers are not bound
to use the greatest precaution of which the tion must be directed not simply against
human mind is capable of imagining, but
dangers from the condition of the rails,
are only answerable for the consequences cars, brakes, or from the conduct of the
which are natural and probable, and might
employees of the company, but also from
be foreseen by ordinary intelligence.McGraw v. Stone, 53 Pa. 436; Meier v. such as may arise from the acts of fellowPa. Railway Co., 64 Pa. 225; Putman v. passengers. It must not be indifferent to
Broadway and Seventh Avenue Railway the character and conduct of its passengers.
Co., 55 N3.Y. 108.
The boarding of a train by a drunken man
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
should, if possible, be prevented, unless,
On the trial of the case the plaintiff of- when he is aboard, he can be so guarded as
fered to show that William Jacobs, the to be innocuous to other passengers. If
ticket agent of the Cumberland Valley the company negligently permits a noiRailroad in the borough of Carlisle, sold a some person to get on the car, or negliticket to James Townsend,'from Carlisle gently suffers him to remain on, or to into Harrisburg, on the 1st day of July, 1897. sult and assault passengers while on the
James Townsend had resided in the said car, it is remiss and censurable, and will
borough of Carlisle for many years, and be liable for the consequences.-Pittsburg,
was well known to the ticket agent, -as etc., R. R. Co. v. Pillow, 76 Pa. 510; Pittswell as others, to be a man of unsound burg, etc., R. R. Co. v. Hinds, 53 Pa. 512;
mind, and repeatedly becoming violent Duggan v. B. & 0. R. R. Co., 159 Pa. 248.
Drunkenness is a transient insanity.
and dangerous to those about him. He
entered the car, took a seat, and made no Other forms of insanity may be as disamanifestation until arriving near Mechan- greeable and dangerous, and there is quite
iesburg, when he was seized with an in- as urgent cause for taking defenses against
sane fit, and, pickingup aniron pokerused the mischief which persons suffering from
about the car stove, struck a number of them may commit. As the ticket agent
passengers dangerous blows, one of these knew the condition of Townsend, the jury
being the plaintiff, Peter Brandon, whose must say whether the sale of the ticket to
PETER BRANDON vs. CIMBERLAND VALLEY R. R. CO.
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the latter, without taking measures to apprise the conductor of the circumstances,
was consistent with the care which it was
incumbent on him to exercise. If it was
not, his negligence will be imputed to the
railroad company.
The mere fact that the conductor did
not immediately suspect the presence on
his train of a madman, nor take precautions against his possible violence, would
not, ipso facto, be negligence, nor would
we allow the jury to say that it would.
But, whether he might have reasonably
discovered the condition of Townsend before his approaching Mechanicsburg;
whether, being duly diligent, he would
have intervened, after Townsend was
seized with the maniacal fit, before he inflicted the blow on the plaintiff, we do not
know. Ordinarily it is for the plaintiff to
show that the defendant's servants were
negligent, by showing the circumstances.
With respect to goods or passengers, this
rule does not protect the common carrier.
When an injury is shown without fault of
the passenger, there is a presumption that
the carrier was wanting in care until he
explains the affair consistently with his
innocence.-Laing v. Colder, 8 Pa. 479;
Sullivan v. Phila. & Reading R. R. Co., 30
Pa. 234; Meier v. Pa. R. R., 64 Pa. 225;
Frederick v. N. C. R. R., 157 Pa. 103, 125;
Pittsburg, etc., R. R. v. Pillow, 76 Pa. 510.
While the evidence offered by the plaintiff
would not be conclusive of the negligence
of the defendant, it does, if believed, establish that negligenceprimafacie. For this
reason it must be received. It will then
be incumbent on the defendant to show
that, with all reasonable diligence, it could
not have anticipated and guarded against
the assault on the plaintiff.
We will receive the evidence.

and quality.-Wheatly v. Chrisman, 12
Harris, 298; McCallum v. Germantown
Water Co., 54 Pa. 40.
2. The right of upper riparian owner is
not measured by reasonable demands of
his business. Howell v. McCoy, 3 Rawle
268; Elder v.. Lykens Valley Coal Co., 157
Pa. 400; Lentz v. Carnegie, 145 Pa. 612.
M. J. RYAN and W. L. SHIPMAN for
defendant.
1. Domestic and primary uses are subservient to the rights of mine owners to
the use of a stream. - Sanderson v. Penn.
Coal Co., 113 Pa. 146.
2. Recovery for pollution of a stream
cannot extend to pollution caused by mine
water pumped out containing impurities
arising from natural causes. -Act 14, Pollution, p. 4484, Brightley's Digest.
3. An injunction must not be granted
merely because a useful employment produces injury and discomfort to those near
it.-Hockenstine's Appeal, 70 Pa. 102.

CITY OF HARRISBURG vs. LYKENS
COAL CO.

OPINION OF THE COURT.
Were the plaintiff a private person, and
did he complain simply of the loss of a
water supply which was useful to him, but
not essential, the bill doubtless would be
demiiurrable. Coal mining is a legitimate
business, and if the pollution of the water
was the unavoidable result of its prosecution, and if the water thus polluted was
not indispensable, the courts would refuse
not merely to prohibit it, but even to allow

Pollution of river water-Right of coal
company to dump refuse into stream to
injury of lower owners.
Motion in equity.
SARA M. MARVEL and CHAS. C. SLOAN
for plaintiff.
1. Every riparian proprietor has a right
to water flowing through his land, and to
have it in its natural state as to quantity

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The plaintiff complains that the Lykens
Coal Co. is and has been engaged in mining anthracite coal for more than twenty
years on a small stream which runs into
the Susquehanna river: The washings
from the coal and culm are run into. this
stream, and hence into said river. The
said city of Harrisburg is situated on the
Susquehanna river, fifteen miles below the
point where the stream from the mine
empties into the Susquehanna river. The
city owns water wi'orks, and supplies its inhabitants with water drawn from the said
river, and has been doing so for more than
twenty years. Latterly the waters of the
river have become turbid, impure and
foul, owing to the washings from the
mines of the defendant coal company and
others. The health of the citizens of the
city is seriously affected thereby. The
plaintiff prays to restrain the defendant
from further discharging the washings into
the said river, and asks the court to grant
an injunction so restraining them.
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the recovery of damages on account of it.
In Penna. Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa.
126, a recovery was refused, the court adverting inter clia to the fact that the
stream had not become a nuisance, involving the " general health and well-being of the coniniuiity;"' that the conmunity, including the plaintiff; was "supplied with abundant pure water froni other
that the cmmunity was not
sources, al
complaining on any ground.'--113 ]'a. 149.
It also remarked on the (rifling character
of the inconvenience to the plaintiff.
In essential respects the ease before us is
diffbrent. In the case cited, Sanderson
alone was the complainant. In this a
large community, constituting a busy and
important city, the capital of the State.
In the former case it was not alleged that
every source of water supply of the plaintiff had been polluted by the defendant.
He still had sufficient water from other
streams. Sanderson did not allege and
show that his health was impaired by the
effect of the mine water. The bill before
us asserts that "the health of the citizens of
the city is seriously affected" by the acts
of the defendant.
In Commonwealth v. Russell, 172 Pa.
506, the Butler Water Co. had supplied
water to the borough of Butler from the
year 1878 with water from the Connoquenessing creek. In 1895 Russell commenced
to pump oil wells on the water shed of this
creek, with the consequence that the water
of the creek was rendered saline and impotable. The Attorney General filed a bill to
restrain the prosecution oftheoperations at
thp oil wells. The decree of the Court of
Common Pleas dismissing the bill was reversed by the Supreme Court, Williams J.
contrasting tle case before the court with
that of Sanderson v. the Penna. Coal Co.
One of the questions to be considered was,
he said, "Is a city as helpless toprotect the
water supply as Sanderson was held to be?
Does a great municipality stand on the
same ground, when the water supply for
its multitudes of people is under consideration, as a single property owner must
stand under Sanderson v. the Coal Co. ?"
For over twenty years Harrisburg has
been deriving its water from the Susquehanna, and the water has been clean, pure
and wholesome. Latterly it. has been
made turbid, impure and foul, and the

health of those who drink it has been seriously affected, and, so far as appears,
there is no other water to drink. While it
is of importance to Pennsylvania that coal
should be mined, it is also of importance
that 40,000 people should have water to
drink, which shall he pure and wholesonie.

We are not convinced that

the

particularoperations of the Lykens Coal
Company, which produce the injury coniplained of, are as essential to the welfare of
t lie State as is the proplmer supply of water
to the inhabitants of Harrisburg. The
water pollution complained of is recent.
The Lykens Coal Co. has been extracting
coal from its mines for twenty years. It
does not appear why the quality of the
Susquehammna water has not been impaired
until lately, nor can we assume that, as
the maintenance of the purity of the water
was consistent for twenty years with the
mining of the defendant, it is now absolutely inconsistent with the continued
prosecution of it. It is quite evident that
to compel Harrisburg to seek a supply of
water from some other source would entail immense expense on its inhabitants,
and render valueless much of their past
expenditure. It is by no means clear that
the Lykens Coal Co. could not, with
much less expense and hardship to itself,
prevent the flowage of its mines from entering the Susquehanna river where it
now does, than the city would suffer if the
present state of things continues.
It has been suggested that the fact that
the pollution of the water complained of is
alleged to have been caused by the operations, not only of the Lykens Coal Co., but
also of others, prevents the court from
granting the remedy of injunction. It
would be much more difficult to determine
how much of a given injury, caused by
several not acting in concert, was due to
each of them, and to apportion to each the
damage foel which he should be liable.
Yet such apportionment is nmade.-Gallagher v. Kemmerer, 144 Pa. 509; Boyd v.
Insurance Patrol, 113 Pa. 269. The mere
fact that some other company is also polluting the stream cannot be an obstacle to
a several injunction against it, as well as
against the defendant.
The demurrer is overruled, and the defendant is ordered to answer.

THE FORUM.
SAMUEL WILSON vs. EDISON IL-

LUTMINATING CO.
Company declared negligent as matter of
law-Cont2ibutorw negligence for the
jury.

Tort.
A.

Al.

DEVALL and

CHARLES MEYER

for the plaintiff.
1. Actionable negligence is the inadvertent failure of a legally responsible person to use ordinary care, under the circumstances, in observing or performing a
non-contractural duty implied by law,
which failure is the proximate cause of injury to a person to whom the duty is due.
-Am. & Eng. lEncyc., Vol. 16, p. 389;
Unger v. Forty-second St. R. R. Co 51 N
Y. 497; Kelsey v. Barney, 12 N. Y 425
O'Brien v. Phila. R. R. Co., 3 Phila. 76;
Turnpike Co. v. Phila. R. 1. Co., 54 a.
345; Phila. R. R. Co. v. Singer, 78 Pa. 225.
2. The fact that the children threw the
old wire over the guy wire could not be an
intervening cause. The electricity in the
guy wire being the proximate cause. Scott v. Hunter, 46 Pa. ]92; Oil City Gas
Co. v. Robinson, 99 Pa. 1; Thomas v.
Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397; Scott v. Shepherd, 1 Smithe S. C. 417.
3. As to whether young Wilson was
guilty of contributory negligence is a question for the jury, according to the stateinent of facts, and not a question for the
court.-Chatauqua Ice Co. v. McLuckey,
I I At. Rep. 616; Gatesv. Pa. R.R. Co., 154
Pa. 566; Am. & Eng. Encyc., Vol. 7, p.
456; Lee v. Woolsey, 109 Pa. 124.
JNo. TH OMPSO CALDWELL and MARLIN WOLF fordefendant.
1. Notice to the employee, whose duty
it was to tend the light and repair it, is not
notice to the company. -Patterson v. Pillsbury and Con. R. R. Co., 76 Pa. 390;.Fra.
zier v. Pa. R. R. Co., 38 Pa. 104; Toy v. U.
S. Cartridge Co., 159 Mass. 313.
2. The fact that the children threw the
old wire over the guy wire is an intervening cause of the accident, for which the
company would not be liable.-Carlin v.
Towne, 103 Mass. 507; Ins. Co.-v. Meed, 7
Wallace 44.
3. By taking hold of the wire, which he
knew was charged, the injured party committed an act of contributory negligence.
-Chartiers Township v. Philips, 122 Pa.
601; Bently V. Cramer, 137 Pa. 247; Fugerson v. Phila. Traction Co., 20 Phila.
249; Bradwell v. Pittsburg R. R. Co., 27
W. N. C. 264.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The Edison Co. supplies Altoona with
light. - At a certain corner it maintains a
light. It is stationed on an iron arm, projecting from a pole 30 feet high. To steady

the pole, guy wires run north and south,
and east and west, along the streets, and
connect the iron arm with poles about 150
feet from the light. One of the stay poles
is in front of Samuel Wilson's house. The
guy wire is attached to this pole, about 14
feet above the ground.
Two feeding wires run to each lamp.
They are covered with an insulating substance. From one of these wires the stibstance had been worn by its rubbing
against the iron arm, under the action of
the wind, so that the electricity, for six
months prior to the accident about to be
described, escaped to the arm and thence
to the guy wire. That the guy wire was
charged with electricity was noticed by
Mr. Wilson and nearly all the neighbors
during that time. When the wind blew
the branches of trees against it sparks
were emitted, and the branches were
burned. Several boys observed that the
stay pole was electrified; and that, when
they stuck their penknives into the pole,
and touched the knives, they received a
shock. On damp nights a flame appeared
at times where the feeding wire crossed the
iron ai.
Mr. Wilson, about two months before
the accident, notified the employee whose
business it was to repair daily thelamp,
and again a month later. About a month
later Mr. Carner notified the same employee that the guy wire was charged, and
that the iron bar would be burned off if
something was not done. On the evening
of the day following this last notice several boys threw a piece of wire, eight feet
long, over the guy wire in front of Mr.
Wilson's house. The noise made by them
brought from the house to the porch Mr.
Wilson and his son, William. seventeen
years old. The boys were putting sticks
to the piece of wire and saying that they
obtained shocks. William Wilson was in
such a position that he could have seen
them do this. A Mr. Kendlebinder, living
near the Wilsons, having a piece of leather
in his hand, caught with it the wire and
was.quite violently shocked, but William
could not have seen this. Mr. K: chased
the children 3,way, but, on his retiring,
they returned. Young Wilson then went
out, took hold of the wire to pull it off, and
was instantly killed. As he fell he touched
his sister, and violently shocked her. Af-
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ter his death a dog ran against the wire,
and was killed.
The action is founded on the negligence
of the illuminating company. That it was
its duty to preserve the insulation of the
feed wires can hardly be disputed, nor that
it was bound to make periodical examination of them in order to see what their
condition was. From the evidence, the
jury would be justified in finding that for
eight weeks before the accident the electricity had been noticeably escaping from
the feed wires to the guy wires and poles.
That with reasonable attention to duty the
company would have ascertained the facts
in time to prevent the accident is indisputable. We say to you, asmatter of law,
that if the wires were for eight weeks in
the condition described by the witnesses,
the non-discovery of it by the company
was ipso facto negligence. The company
was bound to learn in that period of time
the actual state of the wires. Cf. cases
cited in 2 Boroughs, 150.
It is unnecessary to decide whether notice to the lamp repairer would have been
notice to the company. It was, so far as
appears, not his business to substitute new
wires for those whose insulation had been
destroyed, nor to examine the condition of
the wires and report it. From what appears, we cannot conclude that the notice
to him would have bound the company.
But, the company was bound, through
somebody, to know the state of the wires
before the happening of the accident, if
that state continued so long as the evidence
for the plaintiff indicates.
The direct cause of Wilson's death was
his contact with the piece of wire eight
feet long. This was not a part of the system of the illuminating company. It had
been thrown over the guy wire by wanton
boys. We do not see, however, how this
prevents a liability of the company for the
death of Wilson. If the act of the boys
was such that the probability of it ought
to have been present in the mind of the
corloration, they ought to have taken
steps to withdraw the temptation to do it,
and to prevent its consequences. That
boys night do such an act, the jury might
well find, should have occurred to the defendant. We cannot say that it was so
improbable that the company was not
bound to have contemplated it as one of

the expectable consequences of their
neglect.-Fairbanks v. Kerr, 70 Pa. 86;
Guille v. Swan, 19 John. 381; Cooley, Torts,
81.
The important question still remains,
whether William Wilson, the boy who
was killed, was negligent. The action is
by the father for his death, but his negligence will prevent a recovery by the father,
as much as, were lie alive, it would prevent a recovery by himself for injuries.
Young Wilson's act of taking hold of the
wire was deliberate. Did he know that it
was charged with electricity? The jury
may well infer, from what is shown, that
lie did. Did he know that the charge
would be communicated to him, if lie
touched the wire? We think the jury
may conclude from what is proven that he
did. He was in such a position that lie
could have seen the boys putting sticks to
the wire, and could have heard them declare that they received shocks. Did lie
know that the shock might be dangerous?
He was but 17 years old. Had he gone to
school? Had he there learned anything
of electricity, and in particular of the
effects of a charge on a human body? Had
he ever seen serious consequences from
electric shock ? Had he ever heard of
them? Until recently general ignorance
prevailed as to the properties, or even as
to the existence of the subtle force called
electricity. We do not think it safe to
say, as matter of law, that Wilson had
such knowledge as made his seizing the
wire, an act of negligence. But if you,
gentlemen of the jury, should find that
the deceased knew that the taking hold of
the wire was dangerous, it will be impossible for you to render a verdict for the
plaintiff.
WILLIAM SMITH, ADMR. OF JOHN
JONES vs. B. INS. CO.
Accident insTurance policy-osquito bite
-Recovery by executor on policy.
Motion for compulsory non-suit.
ARTnUR l. DEVALL and GEORGE W.
AUBREY for plaintiff.
Death by accident has been defined to
be death from an unexpected event which
happened as by chance, or which does not
take place according to the usual course of
things.
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Ace. Ins. Co. v. Burroughs, 69 Pa. 43;
Malloy v. T. Ins. Co., 47 N. Y. 52; Buckhard v. T. Ins. Co., 102 Pa. 262; U. S. Mut.
Ace. Asso. v. Barry, 131 U. S. 100.
Injuries held to have resulted through
accidental means. Peritonitis caused while
using a pitchfork.-Ins. Co. v. Burroughs,
69 Pa. 43- Aspbyxiation.-Paul v. T. Ins.
Co., 112 K. Y. 472; Pickett v. Pacific Mut.
Ins. Co., 144 Pa. 79 ; Sting of insect.-ut.
Ace. Asso. v. Berdleman, I Mon. 481.
RUBY R. VALE and WALTER L. HOucm
for defendant.
The burden is upon the plaintiff to show
by preponderance of evidence that death
was the result of accident. Searles v. R.
R. Co., 101 N. Y. 661; Taylor v. Yonkers,
105 N. Y. 209.
If death be in consequence of disease as
distinguished from accident, there can be
no recovery. Paul v. T. Ins. Co., 112N. Y478; Bacon v. Ins. Co., 44 Hun. 599; Pol.
lock v. U. S. M. A. A., 102 Pa. 309.
Anthrax ormalignant pustule isadisease
and not an accident within the meaning
of the policy. Agnew's Surgery, Vol. 1.
271; Bacon v. U. . M. A. A., 123 N. Y,
309.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.

John Jones lived in Western Penna. He
was employed by an express company.
During the summer of 1898, he was ordered
to a mountain resort to aid in unloading
expressage. One night he was bitten by a
mosquito under the left eye. Sometime
after (three weeks) he became sick. At
the spot where the mosquito had bitten
him a slight swelling appeared. It gradually increased in size. At last it became
malignant and from the effects of the same
he died. The doctors attending ascribed
the cause of death to anthrax. They also'
advanced the idea that the death was due
to the mosquito bite, that the mosquito
had been feeding on decayed fish, etc., that
had been near the residence of Jones while
in the mountains. Win. Smith seeks to
recover on the Accident Insurance Policy
held by Jones in said Ins. Co. The question is, upon the facts stated, was there an
accident?
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The defendant issued to John Jones, a
policy wherein it agreed to pay to his executor or administrator the sum of $5,000,
if he should die by accident. The evidence
tends to show that Jones was stung under
the eye by a mosquito, one evening in the
summer of 1898, that, three weeks later, a
slight swelling appeared where the sting

had taken place, which gradually increased
in size, and that, at length, death ensued.
The opinions of the physicians conduced
to sustain the theory that the mosquito
had been feeding on decayed fish, that it
had injected animal poison into the cheek
of Jones, and that thus, a disease, termed
by them anthrax, had been set up, producing death.
If Jones has died by accident, his executor, Smith, should recover. Accident
does not exclude causation. Every event
is caused, and no event more so than another. Nothing could be accidental, if the
accidental were the uncaused.
Accident does exclude purpose to produce the event of which it is predicated.
If A applies a knife to his finger with the
purpose of cutting it, the cutting is not accidental. If B should plunge purposely
into the Niagara and be swept over the
Falls, his descent would not be an accident.
It was the result that was expected as
certain or probable.
But, many things happen to a man,
daily, which he does not forsee, nor intend,
and yet which are not in ordinary parlance
They belong to
known as accidents.
classes of phenomena that occur often, and
whose happening awakens no surprise.
We think there is no accident, in the sense
of the policy, unless an event of an unusual
and somewhat surprising class, occurs.
When such an event is followed by consequence of a certain gravity and importance,
we may call it an accident. "An accident,"
says McCollum, J., "is an unusual or unexpected result, attending the operation or
performance of a usual or necessary act or
event, Hey v. Liability etc. Co., 181 Pa.
220.
The bite of a mosquito, in a region in
which mosquitos are abundant, could not
be termed accidental. But, the inoculation by such a bite, of the person bitten,
with a virus capable of setting up a fatal
disease, would be an accident, for such a
concomitant is extremely unusual. The
sting of an insect in the foot, disabling the
person stung for some weeks, was deemed
an accident, in Accident Asso. v. Beidelman, 1 Mona. 481. That in jumping from
a platform four feet high, an athletic man
should cause a fatal stricture of the deodenum, is an accident, U. S. Mut. Accident Asso. v. Barry, 131 U. S. 100. So is
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striking one's self ol the abdomen with
the handle of a fork, while pitching hay,
in such a way as to cause peritoneal inflammation. N. A. Life etc. Co. v. Burroughs,
69 Pa. 43. The encountering in a shallow
well, of carbonic acid gas, when one descends into it to repair a pump so that asphyxiation follows, is also an accident.
Pickett v. Ins. Co. 144 Pa. 79. Cf. Burkhard v. Ins. Co., 102 Pa. 262; Mallory v.
Travellers' Ins. Co., 47 N. Y. 52, Paul v.
Travellers' Ins. Co., 112 N. Y. 472.
The deposit of animal ptomaine, or
poison, by means of the mosquito, was, we
think, an accident. - But, was the death,
a death "by accident." Death is accidental, not as we have seen. because it is
uncaused; but because the event which
caused it was peculiar and rare. The
virus being lodged in his body, we do not
know whether the development of the
disease that followed in the case of Jones,
is rare or not. Probably not. Nor do we
know whether death is the usual sequel to
such a disease or not. Even ifitis, it does
not cease to be an accidental death. A
ilan receives an unexpected severe blow,
while on a narrow causeway surrounded
by water. That it should knock him into
the water is not surprising, nor that, being
stunned and gravely hurt by the blow, he
should not be able to get out of the water,
and should therefore drown.
But the
death would be "by accident," Mallory v.
Travellers' Ins. Co. 47 N. Y. 52.
Tile fact that a disease was interposed
between the bite and the death, does not
negative the accidental character of the
latter. 69 Pa. 43, supra; "If" says Biddle,
"the accident produced the disease, that in
turn brought about the result, then the insurer is liable," 2 Ins. 93. It must be remembered that the policy issued to Jones,
did not, so far as appears, exclude death
from disease, from the grounds of liability.
If it had, it would have been material to
know whether the cause of Jones' death
was a disease. The death was none the
less "by accident" because it was directly
produced by a disease.
The motion for a compulsory non-suit is
therefore denied.

JOHN ALLEN vs. PATRICK DENNIS.
Easements-Right to acquire by prescription-Motive, right to inquire into the
same.
Bill in Equity.
J. KiRic BOSLER and LAUBENSTEIN for
plaintiff.
SAMUEL H. MILLER and JOHN G. MILLER for the defendant contended.
1st There can be no easement of light
and air acquired by prescription in Pa.
Haverstick v Sipe, 33 Pa. 368; Livingston
v. Wolf, 136 Pa. 514; Maynard v. Estur, 17
Pa. 222.
2nd, There being no easement, there is
no right to the light and air which cannot
be defeatpd by the owner of the adjacent
land by erecting structures entirely on his
own land, which prevent the free use of
light and air, Mohan v. Brown, 13 Welldell, 263; Haverstick v. Sipe, 33 Pa. 368.
3rd, The fact that the fence was built
through malice should not be considered
as motive cannot be inquired into where
one has a right, 'ohan v. Brown, 26 N.
Y. 264.
STATEMENT OF CASE.

Allen and Dennis owned adjacent lots.
On Aller's was a three storied dwelling
house, in the sides of which, at the three
stories were windows looking over Dennis'
lot, and obtaining across it light, air and
view.
Allen's house had been in this condition
for 23 years, and as Dennis his friend, had
frequently declared his intention never to
improve his (Dennis') lot, Allen, who kept
a boarding house, had specially furnished
the rooms and was renting them at a high
price because of their outlook. A bitter
quarrel took place between Allen and Dennis and the friendship of many years was
turned, at least on Dennis' part, into hate.
Although he had no desire to improve his
lot, nor to erect in any way, le caused a
fence 40 feet high to be erected on his lot
within 2 inches of the side of Allen's house
thus making the side windows useless.
The boarders relinquished their rooms and
left the house. Allen has already suffered
a loss of S300, and will continue to lose as
long as the fence is maiAtained.
This bill is filed to compel the removal
of the fence and to recover damages already
suffered.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

No easement of light, air and view arises
in Pennsylvania in favor of a house, from
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the circumstance that for 21 or more years

it has received such light, air and view
across the neighboring land belonging to
another person. That person may, at any
time, erect houses or other structures upon
his premises, although the result is to cut
offthelight, etc., from hisneighlor's house,
Haverstich v. Sipe, 33 Pa. 368; Forepaugh
v. R. R. ('o., 128 Pa. 217; Tinicum Fishing
Co., v. Carter, 61 Pa. 21, 42; Rennyson's
Appeal, 94 Pa. 147. Thecireumstance that
Allen's house had obtained light and air
acrpss Dennis' lot for 23 years, gave to
Allen no right to the continuance of this
advantage.
Dennis had declared his purpose never
to improve his lot. This declaration was
not a contract. He did not promise to
Allen for a consideration, never to bild.
Nor was the exl)ression of purpose a written
one. No duty of abstention from building
was assumed by Dennis, by anything having the substance of a contract.
It would be impossible to discover an estoppel in the facts proven. It may have
been Dennis' purpose never to build. His
statements may have correctly represented
his mind. But to whom were they made?
To Allen? To others? Under what circumstances were they made? Under such
that he should have suspected that Allen
was going to act upon them? We know
not. Besides estoppel is no substitute for
contract. What cannot be claimed as the
resultof a promise by A, conceived as a
contract, cannot be claimed as the result of
it, conceived as an estoppel.
Allen had no right to the continued
supply of light and air because he had an
easement on Dennis' land, or because he
had a contract with Dennis for such continued supply, or because Dennis has estopped himself from denying his right to
such supply. It is indisputable that Allen
had no absolute right to the continuance
of the light and air. If he had no, such
right, then no such right was violated by
the act of Dennis. But, it is quite conceivable that while Allen had no absolute
right, that the light and air should not be
cut off by any structure on Dennis' land,
he might have a right that his light and
air should not be cut off by any structure
erected by Dennis on his land, merely and
solely in order to cut them off.
Property rights are not absolute. It

might well be sound policy to permit uses
of land, when designed to effect some innocent purpose, and to prohibit them,
when their soleobject istoannoy and hurt.
An owner of land niay intercept percolation of water, so as to destroy the spring
on his neighbor's land, if this interception
is incidental to mining or other praiseworthy operations, while, if its object was
purely malicious, it would be actionalble,
Wheatley v. Baugh, 25 Pa. 528; Chesley v.
King, 74 [e. 164. Water maybe detained
by an upper mill owner, for the purpose of
working his mill, but it cannot be detained
maliciously, for the purpose of injuring
the lower mill owner. Hoy v. Sterrett, 2
W. 327. Tlme external act, viz., the detention i made innocent or tortious, according to its object, as well as according to
its duration, and the quantity of water detained. In Haverstick v. Sipe, 83 P.. 368,
the trial judge told the jury that theplaintiff might recover, if the defendant erected
the fence on his lot, "merely toannoy and
injure the plaintiff," by cutting off his
light aid air. Cf. Paull vs. Halferty, 63
Pa. 46.
There are a few dhdta to the contrary in
Pennsylvania, Glendon Iron Co. v. Uhler,
75 Pa. 467. In Jenkins v. Fowler, 24 Pa.
308, the defendant was alleged maliciously
to have taken down a fence on his land,
and the court permitted a recovery against
him, if he "acted from motives of malice,
or with the wicked and wanton intent to
do the plaintiff an injury." The judgm.ent was reversed. But, the fence was on
a public highway. "which he could not
maintain, except in defiance of law.'
In
removing it he was performing a duty to
the public. It might well be, then, that
the removal of the fence should not expose
him to an action although his motive was
malicious. Black, J., remarks, "Malicious
motives make a bad act worse; but they
cannot make that wrong, which, in its
own essence is lawful." But, that is a
mere truism. If the act, in its own essence, is lawful, neither motive nor anything else, can make it unlawful. A cannot be X and not X, at the same time.
But, is the act in its own essence, lawful ?
Or does its lawfulness depend on its motive? We are aided but little, when we
are assured by the learned judge, "As long
as a man keeps himself within the law by
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doing no act which violates it, we must
leave his motives to Him who searches the
heart." But many crimes consist in the
external act plus the motive. The act of
killing has no legal quality. There must
be something more. If it is negligent, it
is manslaughter. If it is malicious, it is
murder. The question is whether certain
acts with one's property, when adopted
purely to annoy and damage another, shall
be permitted, simply because the same
acts, when inspired by a less anti-social
motive, are permitted? If it is wise to
inspect motives in order to criminalize
acts, why is it unwise to inspect motives
in order to subject them to civil penalty ?
It may well behoove society while tolerating noxious acts when they are not deliberately performed from malignant feelings
to censure and penalize them, when they
flow from malice. Burke v. Smith, 69
Mich. 380; Flaherty v. Moran, 81 Mich. 52;
8 L. R. A. 183; Rideout v. Knox, 148
Mass. 368.
We are aware that many cases seem to
hold a contrary view. Letts v. Kessler,
546 0. St. 73; Cooley, Torts, 832. We prefer
the few Pennsylvania dicta of the cases
first cited. Dennis erected i fence 40 feet
high, purely to spite his neighbor, Allen.
His motive is not disputed. No other object could have been in view. In refusing
to dismiss this bill, we lay down no principle that can seriously impede the free
use of one's land. We affirm simply that
when a structure call serve, does serve,
and is.intended to serve, no other object
than that of vexing and harming the
owner of the neighboring land, the erection of it, with that motive, is illegal.
The injunction may issue.
PATRICK DOOLEY vs. JNO. DODGE.
Promissorynote-Electionto pay eitherin
money or in property-Tender of payment-Interpretation of written instrument.
Assumpsit.
WENCEL HARTMAN, JR., and FRANK B.
SELLERS for plaintiff.
"When the debtor has the election to
pay either in money or property, if he
fails to make tender on the day fixed for
Pavment he loses his election, and the obigee has the right to demand money."Am. & Eng. Encyc., Vol. 25, p. 909; Tiede-

man on Sales, p. 209 ; Church v. Fetrow,
2 P. & W. 301; Roberts v. Beatty, 2 P. &
W. 63; Niffv. Deshong, 81 Ind. 214.
There was no payment by Dodge when
the note fell due, nor was the offer of bonds
on the 13th a sufficient tender, for Dooley
said on the 3rd, after Dodge had lost his
option, that he would sue for the cash; nor
on the face of a bondpayment was the
tender sufficient, for it did not include interest up to date of tender.-Am. & Eng.
Encyc., Vol. 25, p. 926; Eelsman v. Hildebrand, 1 Lancaster 41; Boyden v. Moore,
5 Mass. 364.
Defendant is liable for $1,000 cash, interestup to time ot suit and costs of suit.
Wm. M. FLANIGAN and A. FRANK
JOHN for the defendant.
The instrument sued on is not technically a promissory note. Bills and notes
must be for the payment of money only.Gray v. Donohoe, 4 Watts 400; Cook v.
Satterlee, 6 Cow. 108; Thompson v. Sloan,
23 Wendell 71; McCormick v. Trolter, 10
S. & R. 94.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

The suit is on a note from Dodge, as follows:
"CARLISLE,

Sept. 3, 1896.

"One year after date I promise to pay
Patrick Dooley $1,000, with interest from
date. Payable in bonds of the Amoskeag
Knitting Company, at par.
1' JOHN DODGE."
On Sept. 13, 1897, Dodge offered ten
bonds of the Amoskeag Knitting Co., each
for $100, and $60 in cash, as interest, to
Dooley. The bonds at that time were
worth only $90. Dooley had demanded
payment, not specifying the medium, on
Sept. 4, 1897; and when Dodge declined to
pay, on the ground that he was not then
able, had notified Dodge that he should
sue him for the cash. Before the suit was
brought, viz.: on Sept. 29,1897, the offer of
the bonds was made.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The solution of the question in this case
requires the interpretation of the words,
' Payable in bonds of the Amoskeag KnitDoes the senting Company, at par."
tence mean, that the $1,000 must be paid
in bonds, or simply that, at the option of
the promissor, Dodge, they may be so
paid? If they must be paid in bonds, the
contract is simply for the delivery to Dooley often$100 bonds of the Knitting Co.
The failure of Dodge to deliver the bonds
would entitle Dooley to their value, as
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damages. The non-delivery of the article,
worth $900, would not result in damage to
the extent of $1,000. The word "payable"
might be understood to mean, "which
must be paid." So it was understood in
Johnson v. Hewitt (Ark.), 40 L. R. A. 74.
On the other hand, it might be understood
to mean, "which may be paid." The latter is the interpretation favored by the
decisions of Pennsylvania. In White v.
Tompkins, 52 Pa. 363, the price of an axe
factory sold was $2,300, "it being expressly
understood and agreed that the said payments are to be made in

*

*

*

axes.

,* * The prices shall be $10 per dozen for
iron, and $12 per dozen for steel pole, labeled, papered and boxed." It was held
that the vendor of the factory could not
compel the vendee to pay in axes. If it
was to the advantage of the latter, he had
the option to pay in money. Conyngham,
J., quotes from Chipman's Contracts:
"All agreements to pay in specific articles
are presumed to be made in favor of the
debtor, and he may, in all cases, pay the
amount ,of the debt in money in lieu of
the article which, by the terms of the contract, the creditor had agreed to receive
instead of money." Chipman illustrates
thfis: " If A gives B a note for $100, payable in wheat at a future day at 75 cents
per bushel, and wheat on the day of payment be $1.00 per bushel, A may, at his
election, pay in wheat of an average quality at 75 cents per bushel, or pay $100 inmoney"-Cf Roberts v. Beatty, 2 P. &
W. 63; Church v. Feterow, 2 P. & W. 301;
Brown v. Fisher, 51 Pa. 165. Phillips v.
Allegheny Car Co., 82 Pa. 368, is not inconsistent with these decisions.
The word "payable" being understood as
equipollent to "which may be paid" at the
choice of Dodge, the principle applies,
"Where the debtor has the election to pay
either money or property, if he fails to
make tender on the day fixed for payment,
he thereby loses his election [i. e. to pay
in propertyJ and the obligee has the right
to demand money," 25 Am. &Eng. Encyc.
909.
The note was payable on Sept. 3d, 1897.
Tender of the bonds was not made until
Sept. 13th. The option of Dodge was
thereby lost, and he became bound to pay
$1000 in money. Dooley is entitled to a
recovery of the money, unless there has

been a valid tender. But the tender was
not of $1000 in money. Dooley was under
no duty to receive payment in anything
else than money. Besides, the tender was
not of the entire debt and interest to the
time it was made. Again, it does not appear that Dooley remained ready to the
time of suit, to pay the debt. In addition
no money has been paid in court. Nothing appears to preclude a recovery by
Dooley of $1000 in money, with interest
from Sept. 3d, 1897, to the time of trial, together with costs.
You will therefore gentlemen of the jury
so render your verdict.
JOSEPH JEFFERSON vs. COMMISSIONERS OF FRANKLIN CO.
County Commissionersoffer reward-Chief
of -Police claims the same-Cannot recover.
Assumpsit.-Motion for a non-suit.
WALTER B. FREED and FRANK B. FEN-

TON for the plaintiff.
1. An officer who apprehends a criminal,
when not in the executif n of a legal process, is entitled to any reward that may be
offered for such criminal apprehension.
Bronnenberg v. Coburn, 110 Ind. 169;
Davisv. Munson, 43 Vt. 169; Russel et. al.
v. Stewart and Flanagan, 44 Vt. 170; Gregg
v. Pierce, 53 Barb. 387; McCandless v.
Steel & Co., 152 Pa. 139; 39 Eng. Coin.
Law, 257.
2. According to a Pennsylvania statute,
policemen are entitled to all public rewards
which they earn. Pepper and Lewis Digest, No. 3, pp. 463.
MERKEL LANDIS and ELI SAULSBURY
for defendant.
The Commissioners of Franklin county
had no authority to offer a reward for the
apprehension of criminals. The act of
May 8th, 1889, 1 P. and L., 1035.
STATEM[ENT OF FACTS.

A murder having-been committeed in
Franklin county, the commissioners offered
a reward of $1,000 for the apprehension of
Howard Holmes, alleged to have been the
murderer. The chief of police of Chainbersburg, Jefferson, the plaintiff, suspecting that Holmes was in Fulton county,
went there, and discovering him in hiding,
brought him to Chambersburg where he
is lodged in jail awaiting trial. Jefferson
claims the$1,000, but the Commissioners
refuse to pay.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.

Jefferson's suit is against the Commissioners of Franklin county. Against his
recovery it might be urged, (1) that he did
only that which it was his duty, a peace
officer, to do; (2) that it would be against
sound policy to permit such officers to earn
more than the normal fees or salary; (3)
that the act, on account of which he claims
the reward was illegal, and ex malo non
oritur actio; and (4) the commissioners
transcended their authority in offering the
reward.
It is quite well settled that when an
officer is required, as such, to do an act
and for a prescribed reward, he cannot
earn an additional reward for that act.
Hence, the promise of a reward to a constable for arresting a criminal under a
warrant which he was bound to execute is
without consideration. Smith v. Whildin, 10 Pa. 39; 1 Dillon Munic. Corp. 209.
On the other hand, an officer may be induced to do what he is not bound to do,
by the offer of a reward, and if he does it
he earns the reward. England v. Davidson, 39 E. C. L. 254; McCandless v. Allegheny Bessemer Steel Co., 152 Pa. 139.
Jefferson was the chief of police of
Chanibersburg. The law does not give
such an officer the power, and therefore
does not make it his duty to pursue afelon
into a neighboring county in order to
arrest him. Act June 6, 1893, 1 P. & L.
432. In doing this he was acting in excess
of the duty for which he was employed,
and there is nothing in his official relation
to prevent his earning the reward offered
for it. Bronnenberg v. Coburn, 110 Ind.
169; Davis v. Munson, 43 Vt. 676; Russel
v. Stewart, 44 Vt. 170; Gregg v. Pierce, 53
Barb. 387.
The act for which the reward was offered,
has been done. The offer was "for the
apprehension of Howard Holmes." Howward Holmes has been apprehended by
Jefferson. Prima facie, the reward has
been earned. The defendants allege that
the arrest was under such circumstances
as make it illegal. The burden is upon
them to show the circumstances. We will
not presume that no warrant of arrest had
been issued, or-that any other acts necessary to make the apprehension legitimate
had been omitted.

But the action is against the county, and
unless the county had power to make the
contract with Jefferson, it must fail.
It hardly follows from the power of a
borough council to offer a reward for the
detection of a criminal, Borough of York
v. Forscht, 23 Pa. 391, that county commissioners have such power. The act of
M iy 8th, 1889; 1 P. & L. 1035, authorizes
the county commissioners to employ detectives, and offer such reward as in their
judgment the nature of the case requires,
for the detection or apprehension of any
person charged with, or perpetrating any
felony. But Jefferson was not employed
in the sense in which in this act, the commissioners are authorized to employ detectives. The act further provides that
"upon the conviction of such person [the
felon] the county commissioners may pay
such reward out of the county treasury."
It is evident that the right of the county
to pay the reward, depends not simply oil
the apprehension, but also on the conviction. Holmes the apprehended person, is
"lodged in jail awaiting trial."
We have not been directed to any special
act conferring on the commissioners of
Franklin County, the power to offer rewards for the apprehension of criminals
The plaintiff must therefore be non-suited.
CREDITORS OF JOHN WALSH vs.
FRANCIS DRAKE, ADMR.
Bents accruingafter death of decedentgo
to heirs-Taxesto be paidby heirs-Covenant to repairmay be pe2formed by administrator.
Exceptions to administrator's account.

D. ED.LONG and

WALTER

tT.

HENRY

for exceptants.
The administrator has nothing whatever
to do with the realty in the first instance.
The realty, with all incidents thereto, descends to the heirs.-Reed v. Com., 11 S.
& R. 441; Est. of Charles Martin, 7 Phila.
491 ; McCoy v. Scott, 2 Rawle 222.
GEO. W. COLES and L. HILDREDTH for
administrator.
1. It is error to include in an administrator's account the rents.of the decedent's
land accruing after his death. An administrator who collects such rents holds them
as trustee for the heirs, and not for the
creditors.-McCoy v. Scott, 2R. 222; Baker
v. Reese, 150 Pa. 46; Fross' Appeal, 105 Pa.
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45; Haslage v. Krugh, 25 Pa. 97; MeMean's
Est., 31 W. N. C. 344; Graham's Est., 6
Kulp 269; Adams v. Adams, 4 W. 163.
2. Taxes are alien upon property until
paid. They are entitled to be paid as other
debts of decedent.-Reed's Est., 4 Phila.
280; Casnen Est., 2 Kulp 474.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Francis Drake, administrator of Walsh,
filed his account. The estate was insolvent. Creditors excepted to the account
inter alia, because he had not charged
himself with $500 rents. Walsh had made
a lease to Jacoby on March 20, 1896, for
two years from April 1, 1896, at $250 per
year, payable at the end of the year Walsh
died March 27, 1897. His debts equaled
$4,392. The personal fund was but $2,433.
Another exception was to a credit taken of
$57, for repairs made to the roof of the
house occupied by Jacoby, the lease to
whom required Walsh to make all needful
repairs, and these repairs being admittedly
needful. Another credit excepted to was
$17, taxes assessed on the house on April
11, 1897, and again on April 13, 1898.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

John Walsh had made a lease of his
land to Jacoby on March 20, 1896, for two
years from April 1, 1896, at an annual rent
of $250. He died March 27,1897, four days
before the first year's rent became payable.
On the death of an owner of land it descends upon his heir, and the heir has a
right to control it, to lease it, to collect the
rents find profits of it.-Adams v. Adams,
4 W. 160. Rent falling due after the death
of the lessor belongs to the heir, and not to
the executor or administrator.-Cobel v.
Cobel, 8 Pa. 342; Fross' Appeal, 105 Pa.
258; Merkel's Estate, 131 Pa. 584; Klein's
Estate, 14 Pa. C. C. 94. The tenant will
not discharge himself, by paying it to the
administrator, from the obligation to pay
it to the heir-Haslage v. Krugh, 25 Pa.
97; and the heir might recover it from the
administrator if it had been received by
him.-Bakes v. Reese, 150 Pa. 44; Jones'
Appeal, 3 Gr. 250. Had Walsh died on
April 1, 1897, the first year's rent would
have belonged to his administrator. As
he died before, it belonged to the successor
in the ownership of the reversion.-Bank
of Penna. v. Wise, 3 W. 394. The administrator was not entitled to it, and therefore properly omitted to charge himself

with it. The insolvency of the personal
estate is immaterial.
Walsh had covenanted in his lease to
make all n~edful repairs to the house. Repairs were needful. If they were made
before Walsh's death, the administrator
did right in paying for them. If they were
made by the administrator after Walsh's
death, they were properly made. The
devolution of the reversion on the heir did
not discharge the lessor's express covenants.-Cf. Sanders v. Sharp, 153 R. 555;
Frank vs. Maguire, 42 Pa. 82; Washington
Nat. Gas Co. v. Johnson, 123 Pa. 576; Cf.
Walsh v. Packard. 165 Mass. 189. The
administrator might perform the covenant
in order to avoid liability for damages arising from its non-performance. He is entitled to the credit of $57. He could doubt-less recover from the heirs the amount thus
expended by him.
Taxes amounting to $17 were assessed on
the premises on April 11, 1897; i. e., after
the death of John Walsh; and again on
April 13, 1898. Had these taxes been a
lien on the land, the payment of them
might have been necessary to preserve the
land as a resource for the payment of the
debts of the decedent. If the administrator paid the taxes in order to be able to
subject the land to the payment of debts,
he would probably be justified in.paying
them-Cf. Robb's Appeal,41 Pa.45. But
it is not shown that the taxes were a lien
on the land (Cf. Rutt v Burkey, 18 Pa. C.
C. 445; Wetzel v. Goodyear, 17 Pa. C. C.
110), nor that the payment of them by the
administrator was necessary for the preservation of the land.
The first and second exceptions to the
auditor's report are dismissed. The third
is sustained. The report will be recommitted to him in order that he may correct it.
ST. MARY'S HOSPITAL vs. R. R. CO.
Contract-Interpretationof "untilfurther
notice"-T-jured employee-Liability of
1B. R. Co. for hospital charges.
Motion for new trial.

D. R. REESE and GEo. L. SCHUYLER for
plaintiff.
1. Since the plaintiff received the injured person at the instance of the defendant there is a presumption that the latter
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for, during this time, he was too weak to
be removed or sent away.
The R. R. company did reserve the right
to terminate the service of the hospital by
"further notice." Its language, however,
must be reasonably interpreted. Would
the hospital have naturally understood
that it might be compelled by the retraction of the defendant's responsibility,
either to expel the patient, though such
expulsion would be cruel and dangerous,
or to retain, feed, and tefid him at its own
cost? We think not. Had this intention
been clearly expressed, doubtless the hospital would be precluded from evading
the consequences. From the language
used it was not bound to suspect that the
railroad company would attempt to withdraw its liability before the patient had
reached a condition in which the hospital
could exclude him without inhumanity.
So far as appears, to have put Jalade out of
the hospital would have been to expose
him to weather, hunger, neglect and the
OPINION OF THE COURT.
most serious oftheir possible consequences.
Joseph Jalade, an employee of the de- Though it might have lawfully refused to
fendant, having been severely and dan- accept him, it could not, having accepted
gerously hurt, was taken by its officer to him, eject him at any moment, without
the hospital, who requested the latter to making provision for him. It was induced
take care of him until further notice. Af- to accept him and to incur the duty of reter it had kept him two weeks, and while taining him until he should get well
it would have been dangerous and cruel to enough to be safely discharged, by the
turn him out, the R. R. Co. notified the promise of the defendant.
In Robins v. Dobbins, 2 Forum 85, this
hospital that it would no longer be responsible for services and care rendered court had to consider a somewhat similar
Jalade. Jalade was too weak to be re- question. The ward in that case was not
moved or sent away for twenty days a man buta horse. The conclusion reached
longer, and was retained for that time in was that when A had induced B to accept
the hospital. The ordinary and reasona- a horse, on a contract to compensate him
ble charges fot twenty days' housing, at- for its keep, A could not terminate his
tention, etc., were $30. This the defend- liability for the keep by simply notifying
ant has refused to pay.
B of his intention no longer to be bound,
The agent of the R. R. Co. brought without removing the horse. In St. BarJalade to the hospital, and induced it to nabas Hospital v. Minneapolis Internat.
receive him and tend him. A contract to Electric Light Co., 68 Minn. 2.54; the prepay the hospital arises from this request, cise problem before us received the soluand the assent to it, implied in the act of tion which we have given to it. "The
receiving Jalade. The railroad agent's re- plaintiff" say Mitchell, J., "having taken
quest, however, was that the hospital in a helpless and severely injured man, at
should take care of Jalade until further the defendant's request, and upon its
notice; and, at the expiration of two weeks, promise to pay for an indefinite time, it
the notice was given that for the further would be monstrous if the defendant
keep and attendance it would not be re- could, the very next day, summarily withsponsible to the hospital. The latter, draw its promise, leave the sick man on
nevertheless, retained the patient, feeding plaintiff's hands, and put it to the alterand caring for him, for twenty days longer, native of either keeping and caring for
would be responsible for all medical services. NewEd. Vol. 6Am. &Eng. Encyc.
751; Texas L. P. Co. v. M. F. Co., 38 Am.
Rep. 627.
2. That as it was impossible for plaintiff
to terminate the contract when notice was
given, the contract was not affected thereby, i. e. exists as though no condition were
in it. Tiedeman ol gales, 218; Fuller v.
Brown, 52 Mass. 449; Hughes v. W. Miller, 93 Mass. 201; Vol. 3 Am. &Eng. Encyc.
903.
3. The law casts on the defendant the
duty of compensating the plaintiff for such
services as Jalade's enforced presence occasioned. Robbin v. Dobbin, 2 Forum 85;
Preston v. Neale, 12 Grey 222.
Miss JULIA ANNA RADLE and LEON C.
PRINcE for the defendant.
1. If a continuous contract fixes no time
duringwhich it is to last, and no time is
fixed by law or usage, it may be determined by the will of either party by notice. Clark on Contracts 626; Coffin v.
Landis, 46 Pa. 426; Peacock v. Cummings,
46 Pa. 434; Walker v. Dennison, 86 Ill. 142.
2. This is a simple executory contract
and was discharged by performance.
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him without pay, or else cruelly and inhumanly throwing him into the street."
The case further holds that if the patient
had had means of his own, possibly the
hospital would have been bound to look to
him for compensation, but that it was incumbent on the defendant to show that he
had such means.
As there was no error in the trial of the
cause, the motion for a new trial is overruled. Let judgment be entered on the
verdict.

for the arrest of Smith, und to commit him
for trial. We must first inquire whether
Justice Harper had the authority, and,
secondly, we must ascertain what the effect
of his want of authority would be upon the
legality of his warrant and commitment.
Huntingdon, which is under the borough act of 1851, has been subdivided into
wards, in pursuance of the provisions of
the act of 1874. The whole borough, one
year ago, elected two justices of the peace.
Prior to that, each of the four wards of the
borough had for a long series of years
COMMONWEALTH OF. PA. vs. WML elected two justices for each ward, so that
there are eight so.called ward justices and
SMITH.
two borough justices. As Harper was
Justice of peace-Authority to issue war- elected nearly three years ago, his term is
rant-Effect of want of authority.
about to expire. The act of June 21, 1839,
DEAL and LENTZ for plaintiff.
1 P. & L. 424, provided that "for each
The indictment is legal, and should be ward in a borough shall be elected two
sustained.-Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law, justices of the peace." This part of it,
Vol. 5, p. 96; Brown v. Sunt, 37 Me. 423;
however, was repealed by the act of April
Clark v. Com., 29 Pa. 129.
3, 1851, which requires two justices to be
HARPEL and KENNEDY for defendant.
James had no right to issue warrant for elected in each borough.-Com. v. Eno, 1
Kulp 243; Com. v. Morgan, 178 Pa. 198.
Smith's arrest.-50 Ro. 817.
James is not a defacto officer.-5 Am. Huntingdon is subject, to that act. For
& Eng. Encyc. of Law 106; 118 U. S.441. sixty years, therefore, there have been no
legal ward justices in Huntingdon.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
But, had there been, the act of May 10,
'William Smith committed an assault
1878,
1 P. & L. 418, would have destroyed
and battery on Harry Nissley. He was
arrested before Justice Harper, a justice of them. That act distinctly requires the
the peace elected by the First ward, of the election of two borough justices by the
borough of Huntingdon. Upon this in- vote of the people of the entire borough.
formation an indictment is found, and the It has been in operation for twenty years.
defendant is brought to trial. Attorney So that had the act of 1851 not repealed
that of 1839, the act of 1878 would have
for the defendant asks the court to quash
done so.-Com. v. 1organ, 178 Pa. 198 ; 2
the indictment, because it is founded on
an information made before a justice of the Trickett, Boroughs, p. 40.
We are safe, then, in affirming that for
peace who held his office by no legal right.
twenty
years there have been only borough
The act of Assembly provides that borjusticeships
in Huntingdon, two in numoughs shall elect two justices concurrently
ber.
During
all that time there have been
for the whole borough. Notwithstanding
no
ward
justiceships.
The people, howthis, the various wards each elected two
ever,
thinking
that
there
were such jusjustices, and commissions were issued to
ticeships,
have
in
the
several
wards voted
them. Since that time the borough has
concurrently elected two. Justice Harper for men to fill them, and in 1896 Harper
is one of the ward justices of the First was in this way elected as the justice for
ward, and his commission has not yet ex- his ward. He has at any time been liable
to ouster on a quo warranto.-Com.v.
pired.
Morgan, 178 Pa. 198. But, are the official
OPINION OF THE COURT.
acts done by him nugatory? It is well
The motion to quash the indictment is settled that the acts which a de jure officer
founded on the fact that the information may legally do will, if done by a defacto
on which Smith was arrested was made incumbent of the office, be legal and have
before Justice Harper, and that he had no the same consequences as if they had been
authority to receive it, to issue a warrant
done by a de jure officer. "The general
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rule is, that the abts of a defacto public
officer are valid so far as they concern the
public or third persons who have an interest in the things done, and that such acts
cannot be attacked collaterally."-8 Am.
& Eng. Eucyc. 815. Many Pennsylvania
cases support this -principle. The best
authorities, however, hold that there must
be an office in existence, created by a
branch of the government that has the
power generally to create such offices, and
that it is only the de facto incumbent, of
such an office whose acts have unassailable validity.-8 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 799.
Says Sherwood, J., in Ex-parte Babe Snyder, 64 Mo. 58 (1876): "And a quite extensive research has failed to discover an
instance where an incumbent has been
held an officer defacto, unless there was
a legal office to fill." In People v. Toal,
85 Calif. 333, it was said that there cannot
be a defacto judge of anon-existent office,
and that a resolution of the Legislature,
not passed with the formalities of a bill,
could not bring into being a judicial office,
the acts of whose incumbent would be
valid. In Matter of Quinn, 152 N. Y. 89,
a police justice's office was abolished. He
nevertheless held over, and issued a warrant of arrest for X. The court, on habeas
corpus, released X, because there could be
no de facto officer when there was no
longer an office to fill. After the abolition
of the office, "there would be no appearance or color of right to induce the public
to ask for or yield to action, official in
form, on Lhe part of the former police justice, in the belief that he was still the
officer that he assumed to be."-Cf. Willard v. Pike, 59 Vt. 202.
There are some cases which hold that
though an act of assembly creates an office, the occupant of it is not an officer de
facto if the law was unconstitutional, and
has been so declared by the courts. Of
this class, Norton v. Shelby Co., 118 U. S.
425, is a conspicuous type, Field Justice
ably contending for the principle that
there can be no defacto officer, of an office which is not de jure. Cf. Peolle v.
White, 24 Wend. 520"; People v. Toal, 85
Calif. 333.
On the other hand, some cases hold that
if the office has been created by legislation, even though it be unconstitutional,
the occupant of it will be a do facto offi-

cer, until the courts have declared the law
unconstitutional. In Com. v. McCombs,
56 Pa. 436, this opinion was expressed concerning the office of assistant District Attorney in Allegheny county. It was however, unnecessary to the decision, for the
court was also of opinion that the act of
assembly was constitutional. We have
seen no case which holds that when neither
the constitution nor the law creates an
office, the fact that people vote at an election for a person to fill a supposititious
office, and that the governor grants a
commission as for such office, to the pei:son declared elected, makes the elected
person a de facto officer, whose acts will
bind in law third persons.
In Coyle v. Commonwealth, 104 Pa. 117,
the office of court of Oyer and Terminer of
Adams county existed. The question was
whether the mode of filling it, proVided
by the legislature, agreed with the constitution. The court of Oyer and Terminer
which tried Campbell for arson in Campbell v. Com. 96 Pa. 344, really existed, being
established by the constitution and law.
The only question was whether the two
associate justices were lawful components
of it along with the president judge. Their
right to sit in the trial, was not questioned
until its conclusion. They are pronounced
"judges de facto." The attempt was to
question the acts of a legal court because
of the participation in them, of persons
not legally members of the court. In
Clark v. Commonwealth, 29 Pa. 139, the
court of oyer and terminer had a lawful
existence. The question was -as to the
right of the legislature to declare the judge
who sat in it, the president judge. He
was held to be the judge de facto. There
is no case in which it has been said that
if the law-making power, does not create
an office, it can be created in some other
way, by the defacto exercise of the powers that would attach to it, if it existed.
The people are bound to know the law.
The people of Huntingdon knew that
there was no ward justiceship. The act
of those who voted for ward justices, could
not bring the offices into existence: nor
could the governor's commission. The
decisions of the Supreme Court denying
the existence of ward justiceships had
been before the public for two years, prior
to the issue of the warrant of arrest of the
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defendant Smith. Harper's act was without color of authority, and maldfide. The
information before him can have no more
value than an information made before a
notary public who as such, claimed and
exercised the right to receive informations
and issue warrants of arrest, or before a
grocer or drygoodsman, making the same
claim and exercising the same right.
It must bb remembered bhat two borough justiceships are existing offices, and
are filled by properly elected persons. The
information against Smith was made before a man assuming to occupy a different
office, with a different geographical jurisdiction, and representing a different constituency. No such office exists.
It will follow, from the unofficial character of Harper, that the so-called information and warrant of arrest, were nullities. And from this the consequence flows
that the indictment must be squashed.
Cf. Matter of Quinn, 152 N. Y. 89, People v. Toal, 85 Calif. 333, Ex-parte Babe
Snyder, 64 Mo. 58.
THOMAS WALTERS vs. JOHN
REED.
Compulsory non-suit.
ALEXANDER and FRANK for plaintiff.
Common law courts have jurisdiction in
personal wrongs committed by superior
officer of the army upon a subordinate,
while engaged inpublic service. Hannaford v. Hunn, 2 Carr & Payne 148; Wilson v. Mackenzie, 36 N. Y. 95.
Walters has right of action. Cumb.
Valley R. R. Co. vs. Hughes, 11 Pa. 141;
Goldey v. Pa. R. R. Co. 30 Pa. 242.
HOCKER and BROOKS for defendant.
No liability being shown, court- entered
compulsory non-suit. Haire v. Reese, 7
Phila. 138; Potter v. Warner, 91 Pa. 362.
If one age, the defendant has no right
to pay plaintiff damages, even if liability
was shown against defendant. P. R. R.
v. Adams, 55 Pa. 499; Stanley v. Southward, Grant 355.
STATEXENT OE THE CASE.

Thomas Walters is the father of Aaron
Walters who enlisted in the U. S. army
on May 1, 1898. John Reed is a surgeon
of the-U. S. army whose business is the
care of the sick, and who is given the
power to requisition the quartermaster for
needed supplies. Reed was appointed by
the Secretary of War after his graduation

from a medical college and had had no
experience. He was put in charge of the
hospital at Aiken, Pa. Soon after he took
charge, Aaron Walters was brought there
ill with typhoid fever. For the first five
days he was not provided with a bed, but
slept on the ground. The food supplied
consisted of ordinary soldier rations, and
were not such as a sick man could live
upon. The medicines were not administered regularly, nor was there any nursing by a competent person. It would
have been possible with good attention to
have saved his life, but as it was he died
July 1, 1898.
The plaintiff offered to show further that
by reason of this neglect and these acts of
omission on the part of the defendant, he
was damaged to the amount of $10,000.
The Court entered a compulsory non-suit
on the ground that no liability was shown.
The plaintift moves to take off the nonsuit.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

There are several fatal objections to a recovery by the plaintiff. The action is by
Thomas Walters for the negligent killing
of his son. At common law no remedy
was given for the killing of a person. The
act of April 15,1851, 2 P. & L. 3233, created
such a remedy, and gave it to the widow
of the deceased, or, there being no widow,
to his executor or administrator. The act
of April 26, 1855, 2 P. & L. 3234, changed
the party who was to sustain the action,
making him the husband or widow, the
children or the parents. It is under this
act that the plaintiff must establish his
right to recover.
But, only when the family relation continues to subsist will the death of a child
entitle the parent to recover. When the
child is under age the continuation of the
family relation will be presumed. The age
of Aaron Walters does not appear. There
is no presumption that he was less than 21
years old. If he was more than 21 years
old, it would be necessary to show some
special relation between him and his
father. -Penna. R. .R. Co. v. Adams, 55
Pa. 499; Lehigh Iron Co. v. Rupp, 100 Pa.
95; North Penna. R. R. v. Kirk, 90 Pa. 15.
This special relation does not appear in
this case. For this reason alone a recovery
is not permissible.
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John Reed was bound to exercise due
care, according to the circumstances, towards Aaron Walters. One employee,
whose negligence hurts another, is liable
to the other. The circumstance that Reed
and Walters were both servants of the
Goveriment could not be important. In
the relation in which by this common employment they were brought by the common superior, the former was bound to be
skillful and attentive towards the latter.
The common law duty was not abrogated,
amid for a breach of it an action would lie.
The fact that Reed was a servant of the
United States would not give him immunity from suit.-Mlitchell v. Harmony,
13 How. 115.
But, there is no evidence from which it
can be inferred that Reed's neglect to perform his duty was the cause of Walters'
death. For the first five days he was not
furnished with a bed. But, whose duty
was it to supply the bed? Had the Government made it possible to supply one?
For aught that appears the negligence was
of some other person than the physician.
The food supplied consisted of ordinary

soldiers' rations, and was unfit for a sick
man to eat. But, by whose fault was this?
Had Reed the means of supplying the
proper food? It does not appear that he
did not prescribe it, nor give the proper
directions that it be furnished. The actual supply of the food involves the acts of
several persons. Reed may have fully done
his duty, and yet the food may have not
been supplied. The medicines were not
administered regularly, nor was there competent nursing. But was it the work of
the physician to regularly administer the
medicine? How many sick were there?
How much personal attention to each of
many such was he able to give? It would
have been possible, with good attention,
to save Walters' life. But, would it have
been possible for Reed to have given this
attention? Was it his duty to give it?
At the trial we believed that the plaintiff had omitted to show facts sufficient to
support a recovery. On maturer reflection
we abide in the same opinion. The motion to take off the non-suit is therefore
overruled.

